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Matthew Chrisman 
University of Edinburgh 
 
“What makes us cognitive beings at all is our capacity for belief, and the goal 
of our distinctively cognitive endeavors is truth…the basic role of justification 
is that of a means to truth, a more directly attainable mediating link between 
our subjective starting point and our objective goal” (BonJour, 1985: 7-8). 
 “Naturalization of epistemology does not jettison the normative…For me, 
normative epistemology is a branch of engineering.  It is the technology of 
truth-seeking…it is a matter of efficacy for an ulterior end, truth” (Quine, 1986: 
664). 
* 
“[Truth] is not what common sense would call a goal. For it is neither 
something we might realize we had reached, nor something to which we 
might get closer”(Rorty, 1995: 39). 
“We know many things, and will learn more; what we will never know for 
certain is which of the things we believe is true. Since it is neither a visible 
target, nor recognizable when achieved, there is no point in calling truth a 
goal”(Davidson, 2000: 67). 
“[D]espite almost universal agreement to the contrary, objective truth simply 
cannot function as the goal of our epistemic activities” (Rosenberg, 2002: 
218). 
“The upshot seems to be that no notion of truth, neither a transcendent notion 
of objective truth nor a minimalist notion of immanent truth, can play any 
determinative role at all in our epistemic activities…it begins to look as if we 
would do well to stop talking about truth altogether and just identify the goal of 
our cognitive-epistemic activities per se as justified belief”(Rosenberg, ibid.: 
229). 
– 
Introduction 
At the beginning of Thinking about Knowing, Rosenberg advertises his 
argumentative aim with characteristic panache: “The leading thesis developed 
in this book…is that knowledge is simply adequately justified belief”(2002: 1).  
With this, he doesn’t mean to deny that knowledge is factive: one who is 
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committed to S’s knowing that p is committed to p’s being true.  However, as 
he explains, “Since from any one epistemic perspective the judgements that S 
has done everything requisite to be entitled confidently to believe that p and 
that S has done everything requisite to establish the truth of p stand or fall 
together, a further ‘truth requirement’ is vacuous and idle. Truth may arguably 
be an outcome of enquiry, but it can function neither as enquiry’s goal nor as 
a constraining condition on any de facto epistemic policy or procedure”(ibid.: 
2).  Since reading this, I’ve found his idea both enticing and confusing.  
Ultimately, I think it is mistaken, but, as is often the case with philosophers we 
respect, appreciating why one of their central claims is mistaken teaches us 
as much or more than appreciating why many of their other claims are correct.  
I think a lot of what Rosenberg claims, both in that book and elsewhere is 
correct, so I hope it will be particularly instructive to appreciate why his idea 
that truth can function neither as enquiry’s goal nor as a constraining condition 
on any de facto epistemic policy or procedure is mistaken. 
Understanding why Rosenberg claims that truth cannot function as a goal 
of enquiry or a constraining condition on any de facto epistemic policy or 
procedure requires discussing some dialectical preliminaries, after which I 
shall first state and then explain Rosenberg’s argument for the claim.  This will 
involve pointing out several places where one might want to object to 
Rosenberg, but, in each case, I’ll argue that doing so misses his point.  
Finally, I shall say where and why I object to the argumnt. This will involve 
sketching a way that truth can be usefully thought of as the “aim of belief”, 
even if it’s not properly called a “goal of enquiry”, so that it can, pace 
Rosenberg, constrain epistemic policies and procedures. 
 
Dialectical Preliminaries 
In the course of attempting to explain epistemic normativity, it is common 
to treat truth as the definitive epistemic end. The idea is that there may be 
many different kinds of reasons to believe some proposition – e.g., prudential, 
moral, epistemic, etc., but what epistemology is concerned with, when it seeks 
to explain epistemic normativity, is what makes some consideration a good or 
bad epistemic reason to believe some proposition. We can give a teleological 
explanation of something’s being an epistemic reason if we take truth to be 
the definitive epistemic end.  A distinctively epistemic reason for believing 
some proposition is some consideration, the following of which conduces to 
the end of having true beliefs, rather than, say, beliefs that make you happy, 
are interesting, or save the world.  As the quotes above from BonJour and 
Quine indicate, this is a prominent view; it is also popular for the way that it 
makes epistemic normativity seem relatively un-mysterious because it treats 
epistemic reasons as a species of goal-directed reasons.1 
                                                        
1 Other writers defending something like this idea include Foley (1987), Alston (1989), 
Sartwell (1992), Haack (1998: 203), Beckermann (2001), Lynch (forthcoming-a, forthcoming-
b), Hofmann (2005). 
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Now, some philosophers deny that truth is the definitive epistemic end 
because they think there is no one end that can be used to distinguish 
epistemic normativity from other sorts of normativity.  This is because they 
think there are several distinctively epistemic ends.2 As far as they are 
concerned, truth may be an epistemic end, but we have competing ends such 
as falsehood avoidance, epistemic responsibility, explanatory coherence, 
understanding, knowledge, and wisdom; and these cannot be reduced to or 
understood in terms of the goal of truth.  Depending on what we mean by 
“epistemic end”, I’m inclined towards something like this pluralist position. 
However, the crux of the issue regarding Rosenberg’s leading thesis is, I 
think, precisely what we should mean by “epistemic end”. So it will prove 
useful, even for the debate between epistemic monists and pluralists, to 
consider the more radical argument against the idea that truth is the definitive 
epistemic end. We find the beginnings of this in some suggestive passages 
from Rorty and Davidson (quoted above), who understand the proposal to be 
about our cognitive-epistemic goals.  They argue, roughly, that in order for 
truth to be a genuine goal, we’d have to be able to tell when we achieve it, 
but, since we are always fallible in our beliefs and only ever have other beliefs 
to go on, this is impossible.  Ergo truth cannot be a goal and ipso facto is not 
the definitive epistemic end. 
 
Rosenberg’s Argument 
This argument is suggestive but not rigorous.  I think it is Rosenberg who 
has worked it out most thoroughly in ch. 6 of Thinking about Knowing. He 
claims that those who think that truth is the definitive epistemic end might be 
thinking of truth in one of two ways.  First, they might be thinking of truth in a 
“realist” or enquiry-transcendent way, in that truth is not epistemically defined 
but something that could always in principle go beyond what we might 
discover.  The putative goal then would be to believe that p iff p is objectively 
true.  Second, he suggests they might be thinking of truth in a “minimalist” or 
enquiry-immanent way, in that truth is a matter of mere disquotation. In this 
case, the putative goal is to believe p if and only if p.   
To a first approximation, then, Rosenberg’s argument is this:  If one is 
thinking of truth along enquiry-transcendent lines, then truth transcends our 
beliefs in that there is “no epistemically accessible truth-determinative feature 
of beliefs”(ibid.: 214).  This is because we can never “get outside” of our 
belief-system to check in a non-question-begging way, whether believing for 
the reasons that we do brings us closer or farther away from believing what is 
objectively true. On the other hand, if one is thinking of truth along enquiry-
immanent lines, then truth is immanent to any given belief system in that 
“whatever we currently believe, we hold true”(ibid.: 228).  So, there is nothing 
more to the pursuit of the putative goal of truth about a particular proposition p 
than the pursuit of belief as to whether p, which means that “…the ostensible 
                                                        
2 Kvanvig (2003), Riggs (2002, 2003), Pritchard (forthcoming). 
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goal of immanent truth is … a goal in name only, [since] it does not exert any 
constraints on the actual concrete conduct of our enquiries”(ibid.: 228-229). 
Here is that argument more explicitly: 
(1) There is no epistemically accessible feature of beliefs about the world 
that determines whether they are objectively true. (ibid.: 214) 
(2) If there is no epistemically accessible feature of beliefs about the world 
that determines whether they are objectively true, then there is no way 
to ascertain whether our belief-forming methods result reliably in our 
having objectively true beliefs about the world. (ibid.) 
(3) If there is no way to ascertain whether our belief-forming methods 
result reliably in our having objectively true beliefs, then there is no 
reasonable way to evaluate the efficacy of these methods for achieving 
the end of our having objectively true beliefs about the world. 
first lemma: There is no reasonable way to evaluate the efficacy of our 
belief-forming methods for achieving the end of our having objectively 
true beliefs about the world. (ibid.: 218) 
(4) We accept each of our beliefs to be true. (ibid.: 228) 
(5) If we accept each of our beliefs to be true, then we take each of our 
belief-forming methods to generate beliefs we accept to be true. (ibid.) 
(6) If we take each of our belief-forming methods to generate beliefs we 
accept to be true, then there is no reasonable way to evaluate the 
efficacy of these methods for achieving the end of our having beliefs 
which we accept to be true. (ibid.) 
second lemma: There is no reasonable way to evaluate the efficacy of our 
belief-forming methods for achieving the end of our having beliefs 
which we accept to be true. (ibid.) 
(7) Some end E can be a genuine goal or capable of constraining our 
policies or procedures only if there is a reasonable way to evaluate the 
efficacy of our methods for achieving E. (ibid.: 206-07) 
Thus, 
(8) Neither our having objectively true beliefs about the world nor our 
having beliefs that we accept to be true can be a genuine goal or 
capable of constraining our epistemic policies or procedures. (ibid.: 
229) 
 
The Argument Explained  
I shall now explain in a bit more detail each premise and why I think some 
reasons for objecting to several of them are misguided. 
Premise (1) says that there is no epistemically accessible feature of beliefs 
about the world that determines whether they are objectively true. I think this 
should be understood as denying two things.  First, it denies that there are 
self-evident beliefs about the world.  Perhaps there are self-evident beliefs in 
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tautologies or about the contents of one’s own mind. That’s debatable 
(Rosenberg would deny the latter sort of self-evidence for complicated 
Sellarsian reasons having to do with the ‘myth of the given’; I’m not sure what 
he’d say about the former). But set these aside.  When we form a belief about 
the world, according to premise (1), this belief never comes with an infallible 
marker of its truth.  Second, one of the features of our beliefs may be our 
reasons for holding them, and, if so, (1) also denies that these reasons can 
ever guarantee the truth of the beliefs they support. These two denials 
embody a commitment to a certain sort of epistemic fallibilism. Rosenberg 
characterizes a “fallibilist understanding of the notion of justification or 
warrant” as “one which allows that a person may be justified or warranted in 
believing a proposition which is nevertheless false”(ibid: 136).  Many 
philosophers take fallibilism to be a reflection of the in principle mind-
independence of the world, or the idea that how we take things to be in the 
world and our reasons for doing so must always be distinguished from how 
the world really is. Rosenberg suggests that fallibility is “the epistemic 
reflection of objectivity”, i.e., “that the fact that someone believes that p, or 
even the fact that everyone believes that p, does not imply that it is true that 
p”(ibid.: 217). To fail to recognize this distinction, many think, is to commit to a 
crude form of idealism. 
However, even while avoiding the crude idealism which rejects the in 
principle mind-independence of the world, other philosophers will object to 
fallibilism (and premise (1) of Rosenberg’s argument) based on a certain view 
of what our reasons for belief can be.  They will say that sometimes you 
believe that p because you see that p or you hear that p or you figure out that 
p or etc., and you cannot see, hear, figure out, etc. that p unless p is true.3 
This means that beliefs formed for these reasons are not fallible.  If one’s 
reason for believing that p is that one sees that p, that reason does guarantee 
the truth of the belief.   
If you’re sympathetic to this idea, then you may want to reject premise (1) 
of Rosenberg’s argument.  However, before doing so, notice that philosophers 
more sympathetic to Rosenberg will worry that, even if there is a sense in 
which seeing, hearing, figuring out, etc. that p are genuine reasons for 
believing that p, they are not reasons that are epistemically accessible 
features of the beliefs that they support, since we often think that we have 
seen, heard, or figured out that p only later to discover that we were mistaken. 
In the cases where we were mistaken, it’s natural to think that our reason for 
believing that p was that we thought that we saw, heard, or figured out that p, 
but this thought turned out to be false.  But why then shouldn’t that be the 
story about reasons in the good cases as well? 
One way to diffuse this dispute in the present dialectical context is to 
distinguish between the reason for believing that p and one’s reason for 
believing that p. We can view the former as facts about the subject’s 
relationship to the fact that p, and the later as facts about what the subject 
                                                        
3 Compare McDowell (1982, 1986), Martin (2002, 2004). 
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takes her relationship to the ostensible fact that p to be. Then, if p is false, the 
reasons to believe that p are nonexistent, since there is no fact that p for one 
to stand in some relation to.  However, in such a case, one’s reasons to 
believe that p may nonetheless be things such as one’s (unfortunately false) 
belief that one saw, heard, or figured out that p. 
Deep and perennial philosophical controversy hangs on whether we think 
the primary focus of normative epistemology should be the reasons for belief 
or one’s reasons for belief. However, without being too dismissive of the 
seriousness of this dispute, I think we should recognize that both proponents 
and opponents to the idea that truth is the definitive epistemic end, in the 
sense outlined above, must be committed to focussing on – in the terminology 
of the distinction I just made – one’s reasons for belief rather than the reasons 
for belief.  This is because these philosophers take the claim that truth is the 
definitive epistemic end to provide not only a way of distinguishing epistemic 
reasons from nonepistemic reasons, but also a way of distinguishing good 
epistemic reasons from bad epistemic reasons. What I’m calling the reasons 
for belief cannot by their very nature be bad epistemic reasons, so all parties 
to this debate must instead be after an account of one’s reasons for belief. 
But, if that’s right, then parties to this debate cannot reject (1) on the basis of 
rejecting the fallibilism about reasons it embodies. And, if that’s right then I 
can’t see any other reason to reject (1) short of a commitment to the crude 
sort of idealism that rejects the in principle mind-independence of the world.  
Premise (2) says that, if there is no epistemically accessible feature of 
beliefs about the world that determines whether they are objectively true, then 
there is no way to ascertain whether our belief-forming methods result reliably 
in our having objectively true beliefs about the world. Rosenberg’s idea is not, 
I think, to deny that we can use one belief-forming method to check the results 
of another.  For, surely, it is commonplace to discover that, relative to an 
assumed background method, some candidate belief-forming methods are 
more reliable than others. If, for instance, we come to doubt the veracity of the 
reporting on the propaganda channel and so check it against the independent 
news channel, we may find out that forming beliefs based on what is reported 
on the propaganda channel is not a very reliable way to form true beliefs, at 
least as judged by the reporting on the independent news channel. Instead, 
the idea behind (2) must be that in relying on one method to check another, 
we have to simply assume that the former is reliable. This means that when 
we check the reliability of a particular belief-forming method, we are not 
checking whether it is absolutely reliable but merely whether it is reliable 
relative to the outputs of some other method. After all, if we had instead 
started by doubting the veracity of the reporting on the independent news 
channel and then checked it against the propaganda channel, perhaps we 
would have reached exactly the opposite verdict. And if we checked both 
against our actually witnessing the events they reported on, we may discover 
that the independent news channel is more reliable than the propaganda 
channel, but only relative to the outputs of our actually witnessing the events. 
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What we seem to need in order to tell whether a belief-forming method is 
absolutely reliable is a way to compare its results directly to the objective 
facts. But, given (1), we are only ever able to compare the results of one 
belief-forming method to the results of some other belief-forming method, 
which means that we can never tell if we have objectively true beliefs about 
the facts. This is why Davidson writes, “Truths do not come with a ‘mark’, like 
the date in the corner of some photographs, which distinguishes them from 
falsehoods.  The best we can do is test, experiment, keep an open 
mind…Since it is neither a visible target, nor recognizable when achieved, 
there is no point in calling truth a goal”(op. cit.).   
Lynch objects to Davidson’s thought here, and this is another place where 
you may want to object to the argument I’ve attributed to Rosenberg.  Lynch 
suggests claims like (2) trade on the false assumption that “we can’t 
recognize whether a belief is true or false unless we can compare it to the 
naked facts”(2004: 25). Lynch thinks that the idea of comparing a belief to the 
naked facts is a strange sort of requirement and there is a more natural sense 
of recognizing when a belief is true, on which it should be a truism that we can 
and often do recognize when a belief is true. He writes, “The most natural 
interpretation of what it means to ‘recognize when a belief is true’ is that to 
recognize a belief as true or false is either to confirm that it is based on 
adequate grounds or note that it is not…In this sense of ‘recognize’ I clearly 
can recognize when my beliefs are true or false – it amounts to noticing 
whether or not they are justified”(ibid.: 26).   
However, unless Lynch means to reject premise (1) by following those 
philosophers who claim that there are some ways of noticing a belief to be 
justified which guarantee to us that the belief is true, I can’t see how 
confirming that a belief is based on adequate grounds or noting that it is not 
can count as a way of “recognizing that it is true or false”.  After all, even 
beliefs based on adequate grounds can turn out to be false. 
The fallibilism embodied in (1) is animated by precisely the idea that an 
adequately grounded belief may nevertheless be false and a poorly grounded 
belief may nevertheless be true. If we accept that, then, although Lynch is of 
course right that when we doubt some belief we can check on its grounds or 
justification, this won’t provide a way to check the absolute reliability of any 
belief forming method. It will provide only a way to check one method against 
another – like checking the propaganda channel against the independent 
news channel. This will produce beliefs that we take to be true – in the 
immanent sense of truth – because we take all of our beliefs to be true; but it 
won’t ever put us in a position to recognize the objective truth of our beliefs. In 
fact, I believe this is precisely Rorty’s point in writing: “If I have concrete, 
specific doubts about whether one of my beliefs is true, I can resolve those 
doubts only by asking whether it is adequately justified – by finding and 
assessing additional reasons pro and con.  I cannot bypass justification and 
confine my attention to truth: assessment of truth and assessment of 
justification are, when the question is about what I should believe now, the 
same activity”(1998: 19). 
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Premise (3) says that, if there is no way to ascertain whether our belief-
forming methods result reliably in our having objectively true beliefs, then there 
is no reasonable way to evaluate the efficacy of these methods for achieving 
the end of our having objectively true beliefs about the world. I take this to be 
the least controvertible premise of the argument.  If there is no way to tell 
when we have achieved a particular end, then surely there is no way to tell 
which means are best for achieving it. And, likewise, if there is no way to tell 
whether a candidate means for achieving an end like having objectively true 
beliefs about the world results reliably in this end, then surely there is no way 
to evaluate the efficacy of that means. That’s the simple idea behind premise 
(3).  If you want to get off board here, I’m not sure what else I can say to 
convince you. 
Premises (1)-(3) entail the first lemma.  So, if I’ve convinced you to stay on 
board with them, you’re committed to acknowledging that there is no 
reasonable way to evaluate the efficacy of candidate belief-forming methods 
for achieving the end of objective truth.  It’s worth pausing to notice how 
radical this conclusion will at first appear from the point of view of 
commonsense realism.  Can we really accept that it’s impossible to reasonably 
evaluate our attempts to hone and improve the ways we form beliefs? If that’s 
what the first lemma of Rosenberg’s argument comes to, agreeing to it may 
seem to involve avoiding crude idealism at the steep cost of pointless 
skepticism.   
I think this clash with commonsense realism can be avoided. Recall the 
idea that Lynch and Rorty apparently agree on, viz., that trying to determine 
whether one of our beliefs is true or false amounts to nothing more than trying 
to determine whether or not it is based on adequate grounds.  If we accept 
this, then we may think Rosenberg’s talk of “objective truth” imputes a much 
stronger position to proponents of truth as the definitive epistemic end than 
they really need.  Perhaps, believing truly doesn’t have to be equated with 
infallible contact with the naked facts in order for the goal of believing truly to 
structure our epistemic policies and procedures.  Maybe all we need is a less 
lofty idea of truth in interpreting Lynch’s suggestion that “recogniz[ing] when 
my beliefs are true or false… amounts to noticing whether or not they are 
justified”(ibid.: 26). 
It is in these terms that I think we should understand Rosenberg’s claim at 
(4), that we accept each of our beliefs to be true.  For, there is of course a 
sense in which we accept as true each of our beliefs that we take to be based 
on adequate grounds.  This follows from the fact that believing that p entails 
accepting that p is true.  So, to interpret truth in this way is, in effect, to 
transition to the second horn of Rosenberg’s original dilemma, on which truth 
is disquotationally understood and so “enquiry-immanent”.  
In light of this, premise (5) may seem uncontroversial.  It says that, if we 
accept each of our beliefs to be true, then we take each of our belief-forming 
methods to generate beliefs we accept to be true.  This links a platitude about 
beliefs to a correlative conceptual fact about our belief-forming methods.  If it’s 
part of believing that we take each of our beliefs to be true, then it’s part of 
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something’s being one of our belief-forming methods that we take it to 
generate something, i.e. beliefs, which we take to be true.  In spite of this, I 
think (5) is problematic; however, I’ll postpone discussion of my worry until 
later.   
Premise (6) says that, if we take each of our belief-forming methods to 
generate beliefs we accept to be true, then there is no reasonable way to 
evaluate the efficacy of these methods for achieving the end of our having 
beliefs which we accept to be true. I think the idea is that, since it’s part of 
their being belief-forming methods that these methods generate beliefs that 
we accept to be true, there is no meaningful sense in which we can evaluate 
them as more or less reliable for achieving this end.  Insofar as they are 
belief-forming methods, they will always achieve this end, so there is no way 
that they can serve as constraints on actual epistemic policies and 
procedures.  As Rosenberg puts the point, “…the ostensible goal of immanent 
truth is a goal in name only…[For] nothing can count as a reason to believe 
that we have failed to reach or realize the putative goal”(ibid.: 228). 
However, premises (4)-(6) entail the second lemma. So, if we accept them, 
we’re committed to acknowledging that there is no reasonable way to 
evaluate the efficacy of our belief-forming methods for achieving the end of 
our having beliefs which we accept to be true. 
That leaves premise (7), which says that some end E can be a genuine 
goal or capable of constraining our policies or procedures only if there is a 
reasonable way to evaluate the efficacy of our methods for achieving E. As I 
said above, I think that a lot rides on how we’re to think of the ostensible end 
of truth, which means that a lot rides on premise (7). I suspect it is false as 
stated. However, I’ll postpone criticism until I’ve finished explaining the 
argument. For, even if we’re thinking of the end of truth as a goal, premise (7) 
then states a necessary condition on being a genuine goal which some have 
objected to.  
In his review of Rosenberg 2002, Fantl objects to the idea that for 
something to be a genuine goal, it must be possible to check whether we’ve 
achieved it. He writes “Why buy into the premise that the only thing that can 
count as [an epistemic] goal is something that can constrain our epistemic 
practices or that we can confirm we’ve reached?”(2007: 231).  As a 
counterexample, Fantl gives the example of his goal that his children thrive 
after his death.  He writes, “Regardless of whether my life goes worse if that 
goal is not achieved, there is a clear sense in which I have it as a goal and a 
clear sense in which I have failed to achieve that goal if they do not thrive 
after I am dead”(ibid.).  However, I think this misses the point of premise (7) in 
the argument.   
The point is not to deny that some of our goals are for ends that we will not, 
as a matter of fact, be able to confirm whether they have been achieved.  The 
point is rather that the allegedly definitively epistemic goal of truth is one for 
which it would be either impossible to tell that we have achieved it or 
impossible to tell that we have not achieved it. It’s quite clear how Fantl could 
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tell whether he has achieved his goal that his children thrive after he is dead.  
He’d just have to wait a sufficient amount of time after his death and then 
check on how his children are doing. To be sure, that isn’t humanly possible, 
but it’s clear what it would take to check whether the goal had been achieved.  
By contrast, opponents of the putative goal of truth think it’s unclear what it 
would take for us to check that we had achieved the goal of having objectively 
true beliefs and utterly pointless to check that we had achieved the goal of 
having beliefs that we take to be true.  
Nevertheless, we might still worry about premise (7) for related reasons.  
For it may seem that it is enough, in order for something to be one of my 
goals, that I take it that some means are better than others. Consider, for 
example, the ostensible goal of getting into heaven, which, for the sake of 
argument, suppose we cannot even in principle ascertain whether we have 
achieved it since heaven is pure bliss and devoid of unified consciousnesses. 
In this case, (7) implies that getting into heaven cannot be a genuine goal; 
however, it seems clearly possible to have this as one of our goals and let it 
prescribe particular conducts, e.g., praying, going to church, etc. insofar as we 
take these practices to be encouraged by having that goal. 
I think Rosenberg’s initial answer to this objection comes in the distinction 
he draws between a motive and a goal: 
… a motive is whatever in fact moves someone, and there’s no 
in-principle limit to the sorts of mental goings-on that might in 
fact give rise to activities that we’d recognize as enquiry — a 
desire for money or fame or respect…In this sense, a desire for 
objective truth might indeed motivate enquiry. But it doesn’t 
follow that objective truth can function as the goal of enquiry, 
and that becomes clear when we observe that, unlike such other 
potential motivating desires as those for money or fame or 
respect, a desire for objective truth is one that we can’t ever 
determine has been satisfied.(ibid.: 219fn.) 
If a motive is whatever in fact moves one to act, then what is a goal? The 
causal-psychological description of a motive suggests that the contrasting 
notion of a goal could be understood in terms of the distinction between 
motivating and validating practical reasons. A motivating reason is part of the 
best psychological explanation of why an agent acts as she does, and a 
validating reason is whatever would validate a particular action (whether or 
not the agent actually performs it or performs it for that reason). On this 
reading, Rosenberg’s claim is that a desire for truth can provide a motivating 
reason for particular actions, but truth cannot provide a validating reason, and 
thus is not a goal, because it’s impossible to tell whether it has been 
achieved. So, a goal is distinguished from a mere motive in that it validates, 
i.e. provides a validating reason for, the relevant action.  
But in order to evaluate this idea and to see how it supports (7), we need 
an account of “validating reasons” in the context of the question of whether 
truth is the distinctive epistemic goal.  What are the relevant actions that may 
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or may not be validated in this case?  To begin, Rosenberg proposes the 
following: 
The specification or formulation of a goal...is characteristically 
the first step in a process of means-ends reasoning. In 
traditional terms, it yields the major premise of a practical 
syllogism: 
  (P1) I/We shall achieve E 
  (P2) The only/best means for achieving E are M 
 (P3) So, I/we shall adopt M. (ibid.: 206) 
The idea here is that since the practical syllogism is the traditional formulation 
of instrumental reasoning per se, we can define the sense of “goal” that is 
relevant to the argument by means of the functional role of goals in practical 
syllogisms. With respect to the activity of enquiry, Rosenberg is specific about 
what he thinks it would take for truth to be the relevant goal.  He writes, “What 
we need, to make sense of the idea that true belief is the goal of enquiry…is 
an instantiation of this general practical syllogistic form which establishes a 
connection between a commitment to that goal and the actual conduct of 
enquiry; that is, which shows how our having the goal of truth can structure 
our actual concrete cognitive-epistemic practices”(ibid.: 207).   
The general idea seems to be that some end E can provide a validating 
reason for doing M only if we can produce an instantiation of the practical 
syllogistic form which establishes a connection between doing M and 
achieving E. Whether this supports (7), however, will depend on what it 
means to produce an instantiation of the practical syllogistic form which 
establishes a connection between doing M and achieving E.  For in one 
sense, it has to be trivial that, if some of our belief forming methods are 
indeed objectively reliable, then it is logically, physically, and epistemically 
possible that we can produce an instantiation of the practical syllogistic form 
where the minor premise is objectively true.  And this instantiation would, in a 
sense, establish a connection between these methods and attaining the goal 
of objective truth. The problem with this, however, is that we cannot ever tell 
that we have produced this. That is to say, even if we have done this, since 
the fallibilism of (1) committed us to the idea that the truth of our beliefs 
transcends our reasons for believing them, we cannot distinguish a validating 
practical syllogism from indefinitely many others which do not validate any 
particular action. So, in stronger sense, we would not have established the 
necessary connection unless there is a reasonably way to evaluate whether 
candidate means for achieving x are more or less likely to succeed. So, I think 
Rosenberg means that, in order for an end E to be a genuine goal or capable 
of constraining policies or procedures, it must be possible for us to produce an 
instantiation of the practical syllogistic form which we can tell to establish a 
connection between doing particular conducts M and achieving E.  If that’s 
right, then (7) appears to successfully state a necessary condition on being a 
goal. Moreover, with the first and second lemmas, it entails Rosenberg’s 
leading negative thesis, viz. (8): Neither our having objectively true beliefs 
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about the world nor our having beliefs that we accept to be true can be a 
genuine goal or capable of constraining our epistemic policies or procedures. 
This completes my explanation of the argument suggested by Davidson 
and Rorty and developed most thoroughly by Rosenberg against the idea that 
truth is an epistemic end. I’ve attempted to motivate each of its premises, 
though I’ve already said that I think there’s a problem with premises (5) and 
(7).  I want to turn now to articulating these problems. I’ll start with premise (5) 
because the objection I have to it is more easily stated, but the real insight 
Rosenberg’s argument promises, is in forcing us to rethink his conception of 
epistemic ends as goals, which is basically what funds my objection to 
premise (7). 
 
Two Objections 
Recall that premises (5) is a conditional linking the platitude about 
accepting each of our beliefs to be true to the idea that we take each of our 
belief-forming methods to generate beliefs we accept to be true.  Here it is 
again: 
(5) If we accept each of our beliefs to be true, then we take each of our 
belief-forming methods to generate beliefs we accept to be true. 
The problem I see with this stems from an ambiguity in the term “our belief-
forming methods”.  Premise (5) is trivially true if this means “each of our 
actually and currently deployed belief-forming methods”; for part of what it is 
to be an actually and currently deployed belief-forming method is to be a 
method which generates a mental state in the person who deploys it that this 
person currently accepts as true.  However, if we separate belief-forming 
methods across members of a population or across time-slices of an 
individual person, we can generate a different reading of the term “our belief-
forming methods” that makes premise (5) much less plausible.  For instance, 
if that term means “the candidate belief-forming methods that might be 
deployed by one of us” then surely we don’t take each of our belief-forming 
methods to generate beliefs that we all accept as true.  After all, some of us 
form beliefs by watching the propaganda channel, and, as we have already 
seen, this generates beliefs that those of us who are viewers of the 
independent news channel will not accept as true, and vice versa.  Likewise, a 
single individual may have formed beliefs in the past by watching the 
propaganda channel, which she then accepted as true, but, after she has 
become a devotee of the independent news channel, she will not take it that 
forming beliefs by watching the propaganda channel is a reliable way to 
generate beliefs that she now accepts to be true. 
So far, all this suggests is that Rosenberg needs the reading of “our belief-
forming methods” on which it means “each of our actually and currently 
deployed belief-forming methods”, in order for premise (5) of his argument to 
be plausible.  However, recall that (5) is a premise in Rosenberg’s argument 
along the second horn of his original dilemma for the conclusion that 
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immanent truth, i.e. believing p iff p, cannot be a genuine goal of our 
cognitive-epistemic practices. Someone who thinks that immanent truth is a 
goal of our cognitive-epistemic practices might reasonably insist that they 
don’t mean for us to use this goal to evaluate the efficacy of our actually and 
currently deployed belief-forming methods but rather for us to use this goal to 
evaluate candidate belief-forming methods, such as those used by others, 
those we used to use in the past, and those we might use in the future.  And it 
is not in general true that the belief-forming methods used by others, our past 
selves, or our future possible selves are ones that generate beliefs that we 
now accept as true.   
What this means is that although Rosenberg is of course right that we 
accept each of our own beliefs as true, he’s wrong that this implies that there 
is no reasonable way for us use the ostensible goal of immanent truth to 
evaluate candidate belief-forming methods.  To be sure, as long as we have 
accepted premises (1) and (2), such evaluations will always transpire relative 
to an assumed background of belief-forming methods and so will never get at 
the absolute reliability of candidate belief-forming methods for achieving the 
end of objective truth.  However, the second horn of Rosenberg’s dilemma is 
not concerned with such objective truth. And it does seem that, relative to a 
background method, a method like the propaganda channel can be judged to 
be less reliable than another method, such as the independent news channel, 
for forming true beliefs. If that’s right, however, then Rosenberg’s premise (5) 
is acceptable only on a reading which his opponents could reasonably reject. 
I turn now to premise (7).  In effect, I object to premise (7) because of the 
univocal conception of ends on which it rests.  As we have seen, it rests on a 
conception of ends as goals that can serve as the first premise in a practical 
syllogism.  I think this is misguided in the present dialectical context because 
it assumes that one who thinks that some end, such as truth, may help to 
distinguish epistemic reasons from other sorts of reasons must be conceiving 
of epistemic reasons as fundamentally reasons for some action, i.e. practical 
reasons for some epistemic-cognitive conduct. 
I doubt, however, that the primary objects of epistemic evaluations are 
epistemic-cognitive actions or conducts.  Rather the primary objects of 
epistemic evaluations seem to me to be states of belief. After all, we evaluate 
whether someone’s belief that p is justified in determining whether she knows 
that p, and normative epistemology is concerned with what count as good and 
bad reasons for a particular kind of mental state: belief. To see those 
evaluations as deriving from evaluations of some implicit cognitive conducts 
strikes me as backwards. 
At the very least, this suggests a worrying disconnect between premise (7) 
of Rosenberg’s argument and attempts to use the putative goal of truth to 
distinguish good epistemic reasons for belief from other sorts of reasons.  Yet, 
it may not seem like a very deep worry if we could come up with a cognitive 
action or conduct which is conceptually very close to the cognitive state of 
belief and the reasons we may have for such states. In a way, this is what 
Rosenberg suggests as part of his own positive theory. He appeals to Sellars’ 
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(1963) “forward-looking” and “proceduralist” conception of justification, 
according to which  
justification is itself in the first instance a cognitive-epistemic 
activity — giving reasons, citing evidence, enumerating grounds 
— and being in a position to engage in such activities can and 
often will itself be a consequence of having engaged in other, 
preparatory and enabling, cognitive-epistemic conducts — 
seeking reasons, evidence, or grounds for what one in fact 
believes, however one in fact has come to believe it.(ibid.: 212)   
This is ultimately why he thinks, “the relevant executable epistemic conducts 
can be specified only generically, as whatever is necessary to put one into a 
position to justify one’s beliefs if they are legitimately challenged”(ibid., p. 
213).  
However, there’s a much simpler way to reconcile the fact that the primary 
object of epistemic evaluations are cognitive states of belief with a teleological 
conception of such evaluation.  This is by appealing to a cognitive activity that 
is conceptually very close to beliefs: the activity of forming beliefs.  Rosenberg 
would probably object that although forming beliefs is undoubtedly one of our 
many activities and surely also a cognitive activity, it is not properly speaking 
what he calls an “executable conduct”, rather it is a mere activity like digesting 
one’s dinner or falling asleep.  What that means is that, while forming beliefs – 
like digesting dinner or falling asleep – is, broadly speaking, something that 
we do, it cannot cogently serve in the conclusion of a practical syllogism.  And 
that means that it cannot comprise the epistemic policies and procedures that 
are supposed to be constrained by the ostensible goal of truth. 
That objection, however, exemplifies the way in which I think premise (7) is 
misguided.  Why must we think that reasons for forming beliefs must 
ultimately be capable of being characterized as practical reasons that justify 
performing some “executable conduct”?  Rosenberg might respond: “Well, 
how else do you propose to characterize them?”  So, let me quickly sketch a 
proposal. 
Indeed, I think it is Sellars who provides the distinction crucial for 
developing an alternative.  In a different context, he distinguishes between 
“rules of criticism” and “rules of action”, i.e. between rules that articulate how 
something ought to be and rules that articulate what agents ought to do. 
(1969: 508)  For instance, a car ought to be disposed to start when the key is 
turned and my mechanic ought to do what is necessary to make my car be 
disposed to start when the key is turned. These ought-statements express two 
different kinds of norms. Although, as this example indicates, they can be 
logically related: that my car ought to be disposed to start when the key is 
turned implies ceteris paribus and where possible that my mechanic ought to 
do whatever is necessary to make my car disposed to start when the key is 
turned.  
What I like about Sellars’ distinction in the present context is that it opens 
up conceptual space for a mixed account of normative epistemic principles, 
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according to which the genuine executable conducts of agents are subject to 
rules of action, while cognitive states and mere activities are only subject to 
rules of criticism.4  And this means that we can ask what beliefs we ought to 
form, and understand this question in terms of what beliefs we have reasons 
to form, without assuming that these reasons must be reasons for performing 
some action conceived of on the model of the practical syllogism validating 
some “executable conduct”. Instead, they are conceived of as a distinctive 
kind of reasons: reasons for being in a particular state.   
It is because of the availability of this sort of account of reasons for belief 
and the fact that proponents of the idea that truth is the definitive epistemic 
end or goal have been concerned to develop an account of epistemic 
normativity that distinguishes reasons for belief from other sorts of reasons 
that I think premise (7) of Rosenberg’s argument is misguided.  The way that 
it presupposes that all reasons are essentially practical reasons obscures the 
fact that epistemic reasons for belief are not practical reasons but something 
fundamentally different: reasons for being in a particular way. 
Someone might want to defend Rosenberg here by arguing that whether 
or not epistemic reasons for forming beliefs are fundamentally different from 
practical reasons, those philosophers who seek to distinguish epistemic 
reasons from other sorts of reasons in terms of the putatively definitive 
epistemic end of truth are committed to following Rosenberg in his conception 
of the relevant reasons as being essentially practical reasons.  This is 
because an end just is something we pursue, and we pursue it by performing 
particular actions, i.e. engaging in particular “executable conducts”.   
To begin to see why this is wrong and why premise (7) is false, notice that 
the logical form of (7) appears to be a conditional that embeds a disjunction in 
its antecedent.  The two disjuncts are  
(a) Some end E can be a genuine goal,  
and 
(b) Some end E can be capable of constraining our policies or 
procedures.   
The premise then says, in effect, that if (a) or (b) is true, then there will be a 
reasonable way to evaluate the efficacy of our methods of achieving E. 
However, to put my objection bluntly, I think Rosenberg has illicitly assumed 
that (a) and (b) come to the same thing. That is, what a goal is, on his 
conception, is an end capable of constraining our policies and procedures; 
and an end capable of constraining our policies and procedures just is, on his 
conception, a goal.  However, I want to argue that, even if a goal must be 
capable of constraining our policies and procedures, it’s not the case that all 
ends, which are capable of constraining our policies and procedures are 
                                                        
4 I developed a similar idea in more detail in my (2008), whose central thesis is that ‘ought-to-
believe’s should be thought of as rules of criticism; this allowed me to diffuse the debate 
between doxastic involuntarists, who think belief formation is not voluntary, and epistemic 
deontologists, who think that beliefs can be the proper subjects of epistemic obligations. 
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goals.  If that’s right, then it’s possible that there are ways for ends to 
constrain our policies and procedures other than by structuring a practical 
syllogism that validates particular actions or concrete conducts.   
In particular, I want to suggest that there are two ways an end can be 
related to an activity.  First, as we have seen, an end can be a regulative goal 
of an activity; regulative goals can be used to evaluate various activities in 
terms of their efficacy at attaining the goal.  Second, an end may also be a 
constitutive aim of a particular activity; appeal to constitutive aims can be 
used to determine whether or not one is engaged in some specific type of 
activity.  For example, the legal liability of a doctor when her patient dies may 
depend on whether the doctor was practicing medicine (however poorly) or 
murdering someone (however skilfully). Relative to the goals, respectively, of 
preserving life and of terminating life, we can evaluate how skilful the doctor’s 
conduct was; this is an evaluation of an activity in terms of its regulative goal. 
But skill is beside the point in deciding whether the doctor should be charged 
with malpractice or murder. In order to answer this question, presumably we 
need to form an opinion about which type of activity she was engaged in, 
which we can do if we have an opinion about what its constitutive aim was. 
This is an evaluation of an activity in terms of its constitutive aim. 
Importantly, as I just stated the distinction between regulative goals and 
constitutive aims, it applies first and foremost to ways of evaluating activities.  
Now, some activities may be genuine actions, i.e. what Rosenberg thinks of 
as the executable conducts that can be referred to in the conclusion of a 
practical syllogism, but, as we’ve already seen, not all activities are 
executable conducts, some are mere activities, like digesting one’s dinner or 
falling asleep.  And, as I’ve already said, forming beliefs seems to be a mere 
activity rather than a genuine action. That may mean that it is incoherent to 
speak of the regulative goal of this activity.  In forming beliefs, one is not, 
strictly speaking, trying to attain some goal.  This is because one isn’t trying to 
do anything; forming beliefs isn’t an action.  However, that doesn’t mean that 
this mere activity doesn’t have a constitutive aim.  Digesting one’s dinner and 
falling asleep are both end-directed activities, even though they are not goal-
promoting actions. We can evaluate whether some activity is one of these 
specific types of activities in terms of whether it is aimed at the relevant end.  
Likewise, I think this opens a new route to understanding the claim that truth 
is an epistemic end, usable in an account of what distinguishes good 
epistemic reasons for belief from other sorts of reasons. We could treat truth 
as the constitutive aim of the activity of forming beliefs rather than as the 
regulative goal of some action or cognitive conduct. The idea would be to say 
that what constitutes an activity’s being the activity of forming beliefs is that it 
is aimed at the truth.  But what does that mean? 
I admit that it’s not entirely clear to me, but in what follows, I’ll provisionally 
suggest an answer that I think undermines premise (7) of Rosenberg’s 
argument.  In order to do so, it’s helpful to note two things about rules of 
criticism.  First, they seem to divide into intrinsic and extrinsic rules.  Second, 
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their logical grammar seems to allow for an ‘in order to E’ operator.  Let me 
explain. 
The rules of criticism applying to something seem to divide into those 
which are intrinsic to what that thing is and those which are extrinsic to what 
that thing is.  For example, the rules governing the bishop in chess seem to 
include: (i) The bishop ought to be moved only diagonally, and (ii) The bishop 
ought not to be sacrificed for a pawn.  The first of these ‘ought-to-be’s is 
intrinsic in that it partially defines what it is for something to count as a bishop; 
if this rule is broken with respect to a particular thing, it calls into question 
whether that thing is a bishop.  By contrast, the second of these ‘ought-to-be’s 
is extrinsic in that it is not partially definitive of what it is for something to be a 
bishop; if this rule is broken with respect to a particular thing, it does not call 
into question whether that thing is a bishop, only whether the owner of the 
bishop is a good chess player. 
Moreover, all rules – both ‘ought-to-do’s and ‘ought-to-be’s – seem to 
admit of modification with an ‘in order to E’ operator.  That is to say that, if 
they aren’t already so modified, we can make the full logical form of 
statements deploying the concept ‘ought’ more explicit by adding ‘in order to 
E’, where E is a variable that can be filled in by various ends.  We can refer to 
this as the end-relativity of ‘ought’.5  For example, it may be the case that one 
ought to give to charity in order to develop the character trait of being 
charitable or in order to assuage one’s guilty conscience, or perhaps both.  
Depending on what the relevant end is, we get logically distinct readings of “A 
ought to give to charity”.  Likewise with rules of criticism: It may be the case 
that one ought to be charitable in order to help the world or in order to impress 
one’s mother, or perhaps both. Again, we get logically distinct readings of “A 
ought to be charitable” depending on the relevant end.  The end-relativity of 
‘ought’ shows up with the rules of criticism governing belief-formation as well.  
For example, it may be the case that someone ought to be disposed to form 
the belief that she can jump across certain crevices, in order to believe what’s 
true, but it may also be the case that she ought to be disposed to form this 
belief in order to have the confidence to jump far enough to make it, or 
perhaps both. 
In light of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic rules of criticism 
and the general end-relativity of ‘ought’, I think we can make better sense of 
the idea that truth is the constitutive aim of the activity of forming beliefs.  To a 
first approximation, the idea would be to say some ‘ought-to-be’s governing 
beliefs are intrinsic to belief and belief formation while others are extrinsic, 
and we can tell the difference by the end to which the oughts are explicitly or 
implicitly relative.  More specifically, it’s the ‘ought-to-believe’s which are 
implicitly or explicitly modified by ‘in order to believe truly’ that are intrinsic 
rules of criticism for beliefs, whereas those ‘ought-to-believe’s that are 
explicitly or implicitly modified by some other end are extrinsic rules of 
criticism for beliefs.  So, for example, consider the claim “You ought to believe 
                                                        
5 Compare Finlay (2009). 
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that you are reading this paper.” One thing this could mean is that you ought 
to believe that you are reading this paper in order to believe truly.  Another 
thing this could mean is that you ought to believe that you are reading this 
paper in order to make me happy.  The current interpretation of the idea that 
truth is the definitive epistemic end would treat the former but not the latter as 
constitutive rules of criticism applying to that belief. That is to say that 
violations call into question something’s being a belief. 
That’s suggestive, but it won’t work as it stands. A false belief that p is one 
that would violate the rule “S ought to believe that p, in order to believe truly”; 
so, if this rule really is constitutive of something’s counting as a belief that p, 
it’d be impossible to believe falsely without calling into question the status of 
one’s belief, as a belief.  A helpful modification of the proposal can be gleaned 
from Velleman, who argues that an important difference between belief and 
desire is that for a propositional attitude to be a belief it must (at least) involve 
regarding its propositional object as true, whereas for a propositional attitude 
to be a desire it must (at least) involve regarding its propositional object as to 
be made true.  But, although this so-called “difference in direction of fit” 
distinguishes belief from desire, Velleman argues that more is needed to 
distinguish belief from other cognitive attitudes such as imagining or 
assuming.  This is because these too involve regarding a proposition as true, 
just not seriously or in earnest.  However, according to him. “What 
distinguishes a proposition’s being believed from its being assumed or 
imagined is the spirit in which it is regarded as true, whether tentatively or 
hypothetically, as in the case of assumption; fancifully, as in the case of 
imagination; or seriously, as in the case of belief”(2000: 183).  This suggests 
the following modification of the proposal from the previous paragraph.  We 
could say that it’s the ‘ought-to-believe’s which are implicitly or explicitly 
modified by ‘in order to have a propositional attitude we seriously regard as 
true’ that are intrinsic rules of criticism for beliefs, whereas those ‘ought-to-
believe’s that are explicitly or implicitly modified by some other end are 
extrinsic rules of criticism for beliefs. This, I think, provides a more plausible 
interpretation of the idea that truth is the definitive epistemic end. 
As I said above, I myself suspect that truth is not the definitive epistemic 
end because I’m sympathetic to the pluralist position that there are other 
distinctively epistemic ends, which are not reducible to the end of truth. 
However, the present point is that by understanding the idea as a claim about 
constitutive aims rather than regulative goals we seem to block any conflation 
of (a) and (b), the two disjuncts of the antecedent of premise (7) of 
Rosenberg’s argument. And by doing so, we open up conceptual space for 
the possibility that truth is an end capable of constraining epistemic policies 
and procedures even if it is not a goal, in the sense of being a possible first 
premise in a practical syllogism which turns on the efficacy of certain actions 
vis-à-vis that goal.  It does so just like the end of moving diagonally constrains 
the movements of the bishop in chess.  If the rule of criticism, “Bishops ought 
to be moved diagonally in order to conform to the rules of chess,” is violated, 
that violation calls into question whether the relevant thing counts as a bishop.  
Likewise, if the rule of criticism, “Beliefs ought to be held in order to have a 
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propositional attitude we seriously regard as true” is violated, that violation 
calls into question whether the relevant thing counts as a belief.  And this 
provides a sense in which truth is an end constraining epistemic policies and 
procedures but not a genuine goal, which is capable of serving cogently as 
the first premise of a practical syllogism that validates particular cognitive 
actions or executable epistemic conducts. 
 
Conclusion 
So, in the end, although Rosenberg may be right that objective truth 
cannot be a goal constraining our actual epistemic policies and practices, 
there are, as far as I can tell, two cogent responses defenders of the idea that 
truth is a distinctively epistemic end may make to his argument.  First, they 
may reject his imputation to them of a conception of truth as enquiry-
transcendent and yet reject premise (5) along the enquiry-immanent horn of 
his original dilemma.  I challenged this premise based on different readings of 
“our belief-forming methods”.  Second, they may reject the conception of 
epistemic ends as goals capable of serving as the first premise of a valid 
practical syllogism, which was the idea behind (7).  We saw this to be 
questionable based on possible conflation of the first and second disjuncts of 
the antecedent of (7); and I’ve tentatively sketched an alternative way of 
conceiving of truth as an epistemic end that doesn’t involve seeing it as a 
regulative goal but as a constitutive aim of belief. 
It may seem strange in the present context to subject Rosenberg to such 
a detailed critical reading, with so many ins and outs, objections and possible 
responses.  However, it was him who taught me that  
…to read critically you ultimately need to appreciate more than 
what a philosopher says and why he or she says it. You need to 
achieve an understanding, too, of what the philosopher would 
say in response to your exploratory questions and critical 
challenges.  Only when you have achieved this sort of 
imaginative and sympathetic grasp of a philosophical position 
can the critical attitude be expected to yield more than 
superficial quibbles.  Only then can your critique bear 
significantly on what is essential to the view in question.(1996: 
112) 
I hope my critical attitude has yielded more than superficial quibbles and born 
significantly on what is essential to Rosenberg’s own critique of the epistemic 
end of truth. In short, what I take this to be is a highly original and instructively 
false view about the nature of epistemic reasons and the ends that may 
structure them.6 
                                                        
6 For helpful feedback on this material, I’d like to thank participants at the 2004 Carolina 
Philosophy Retreat at Cranberry Lake (organized by Piers Turner), participants of the Self, 
Language, and World Conference held in memory of Jay Rosenberg (organized by William 
Lycan and Dorit Bar-On), Georgi Gardiner, David Landy, Ted Parent. 
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